Setting Up a Management Carve-Out Before a Distressed Sale
A management carve-out plan sets aside a slice of sale proceeds for the operating team when the price is low enough that the liquidation preference stack would otherwise leave common holders, including management, with nothing.
It exists because a management team with nothing to gain from a sale has very little incentive to run a clean process, so boards use a carve-out to keep the team engaged through a transaction that wouldn't otherwise reward them.
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A worked example of when a carve-out gets triggered
Say a company has raised enough preferred capital that a sale needs to clear a meaningful liquidation preference before any proceeds reach common stock. If the best offer on the table comes in below that threshold, common holders, including the management team's own equity, would receive nothing under the waterfall as written.
In that situation, the preferred holders themselves often prefer setting aside a carve-out pool, because a management team that walks away mid-process, or actively disengages, usually destroys more value than the size of the pool being discussed.
How the pool typically gets sized
There's no fixed formula; boards typically size it as a percentage of total sale proceeds, negotiated between the board and the largest preferred holders, sometimes with individual allocations set by role and tenure rather than an equal split. The size needs preferred holder buy-in specifically, since it's effectively coming out of proceeds that would otherwise flow to them ahead of common.
Set it early enough in the sale process that the team knows the plan exists before diligence with a buyer even starts. A carve-out negotiated after an offer is already in hand looks, and often is, more like a last-minute concession than a considered plan.
The approval that has to happen before the plan is real
The full board, and often specifically the preferred holders whose proceeds the pool comes out of, needs to approve the plan. A carve-out that management sets up unilaterally, or that only some directors know about, creates exactly the fiduciary conflict the plan is supposed to manage cleanly.
Document the approval and the specific terms in board minutes and a signed plan document, not an informal understanding among a few directors. If the sale later closes at a price that makes the carve-out relevant, this is exactly the kind of document that gets scrutinized by whichever party ends up unhappy with their allocation.
The fiduciary tension worth naming directly
Directors who are also members of management, or whose compensation is tied to the outcome, have an obvious conflict when voting on a plan that benefits them directly. Have those directors recuse themselves from the vote, and let independent directors, or the preferred holders directly, approve the final terms.
This isn't about assuming bad faith. It's that a plan approved without addressing the obvious conflict is easier to challenge later, even when everyone acted reasonably.
For example, if the CEO and the CFO both sit on the board, both step out of the vote while the remaining directors and the preferred holders review the pool line by line. Record the recusals in the minutes so the approval trail shows who actually decided. A common mistake is letting a conflicted director stay in the room to answer questions, which can undercut the recusal. Have them answer questions before the vote begins and then leave, so no one can later argue the outcome was shaped by the people who benefit from it.
Formalizing the plan itself
Once terms are set, put the plan in writing with individual allocations, the trigger conditions, and signatures from the board and the management team members it covers. Route it through Foxit eSign so there's a dated, signed record separate from the sale documents themselves, since the carve-out plan and the purchase agreement often get finalized on different timelines.
In sequence, a carve-out plan comes together like this:
- Set the plan early, before diligence with a buyer starts, so the team knows it exists.
- Size the pool with the buy-in of the preferred holders, since it comes out of proceeds that would otherwise flow to them.
- Have conflicted directors recuse themselves, and let independent directors or preferred holders approve the final terms.
- Put allocations, trigger conditions, and signatures in a written plan document separate from the sale documents.
- Decide in advance what happens to the pool if the final price clears the preferred stack.
What happens if the eventual sale price comes in higher than expected
Build in a mechanism for what happens if the final price clears the preferred stack after all, whether the carve-out shrinks proportionally, disappears entirely, or stays fixed regardless of final price. Leaving this ambiguous invites a dispute right at the moment the deal is closing, which is the worst possible time to be negotiating it for the first time.
Most plans tie the carve-out specifically to the scenario that triggered it and phase it out as price improves, rather than treating it as a flat bonus regardless of outcome. That structure also tends to be easier to defend to preferred holders as fair.
What Good Looks Like
A defensible carve-out plan is approved by the full board with conflicted directors recused, sized with preferred holder buy-in, and documented before any buyer's offer is in hand.
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Frequently Asked Questions
Does every distressed sale need a management carve-out?
No, only when the expected proceeds wouldn't clear the liquidation preference stack enough to reward common holders. If a sale is expected to pay out normally under the existing waterfall, a separate carve-out usually isn't necessary.
Who actually pays for the carve-out pool?
Effectively the preferred holders, since the pool comes out of proceeds that would otherwise flow to them first under the standard waterfall. That's exactly why their buy-in is central to setting the size and terms.
Can the CEO decide the carve-out terms alone?
No, and doing so would create an obvious conflict of interest given the CEO directly benefits from the plan. Terms need board approval, with conflicted directors recused from the vote, and often the preferred holders' agreement as well.
What happens to the carve-out if the sale falls through?
Nothing, typically; the plan is contingent on a specific transaction closing, so it simply doesn't trigger if that sale doesn't happen. A new carve-out would need to be negotiated separately for a different transaction later.
About the numbers
This guide doesn't quote a sourced benchmark. Figures in it are estimates or general guidance, so check them against your own numbers.
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